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Abstract 
 
This literature review examines donor approaches to anti-corruption using available policy, project, 
and academic material. This first entails a discussion of the main conceptual issues such as the 
definitions of, and theoretical approaches to, corruption. This is then complemented by a 
discussion of implementation issues - through the comparison of different bilateral and multilateral 
donor approaches to corruption and an analysis of lessons learned from past experience. The 
paper concludes by highlighting areas for further work. 
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Introduction 
 
Due to its controversial nature and implications for the national sovereignty of 
stakeholder countries, aid agencies have traditionally been reluctant to tackle the issue 
of corruption. However, growing awareness of, and empirical evidence on, the 
importance of a country’s overall policy framework for successful aid outcomes 
(Burnside and Dollar, 1997) is pushing donors to develop policies to deal with issues 
of governance and corruption.  
 
Although some economists have argued that particular forms of corruption can be 
good for economic development1, there is a growing consensus that it has negative 
long-term economic effects. According to the World Bank, corruption increases 
transaction costs and leads to ‘inefficient economic outcomes’ – through reducing 
investment, diverting human capital to rent-seeking activities, and reducing the state’s 
ability to generate revenue (World Bank 1998: 1). Corruption also has harmful social 
effects. By driving up prices for basic social services, particularly in the health, 
education, and justice sectors, corruption disproportionately affects the poor. 
Consequently, it can greatly increase levels of inequality, with potentially 
destabilizing effects for society as a whole. 
 
While there are many theories about the relationship between corruption and 
economic development, one of the few robust empirical findings is that poorer 
countries suffer from higher levels of corruption (Andvig et al 2001: 1). In an aid 
climate where donors strive to reach the ‘poorest of the poor’, agencies are – unlike 
firms – obliged to work in contexts characterized by high levels of corruption.  
 
As such, corruption and wider governance issues are moving into the mainstream and 
growing numbers of agencies are incorporating anti-corruption guidelines and 
projects in their work. As more is learned about corruption, initiatives to combat it are 
changing in important ways. According to Klitgaard, the beginning of the anti-
corruption movement was characterized by campaigns to raise awareness. The second 
moved towards studying how and where corruption manifests itself. The third and 
current phase is now centered on establishing effective implementation mechanisms, 
particularly in contexts characterized by high levels of corruption (2000: 1). 
 
It is therefore timely to look at past donor experiences to see what can be learned 
about effective approaches to anti-corruption. While the bulk of work on corruption is 
academic in nature, there is a body of policy and project-related material that permits 
lessons to be drawn. In order to provide an overview of these issues, this literature 
review will be divided into three sections. The first will look at different definitions 
and theoretical approaches to corruption. The second will discuss donor approaches 
and lessons learned from past initiatives. The third and final section will conclude by 
discussing areas where more work is needed.  
                                                 
1 See Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968).  
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The Conceptualization of Corruption 
Definitions 
Corruption manifests itself in multiple ways and has distinct meanings in different 
cultural and historical contexts. As such, it has a variety of definitions whose 
suitability depends on the specific issue being addressed.      
 
The most frequently used definition is the World Bank’s, which classifies corruption 
as the ‘abuse of public power for private gain’ (World Bank 1997: 6). This definition 
is concise and operationally useful for many anti-corruption projects, as it focuses on 
the relationship between the state and society and is broad enough to encompass most 
forms of corruption. However, it is important to note that this definition is state-
centric. Corruption can also occur in the private sector and civil society, with many of 
the same negative implications.   
 
Following the state-focused approach to the concept, corruption has various 
manifestations 2 . It usually refers to situations where ‘an official entrusted with 
carrying out a task by the public engages in some sort of malfeasance for private 
enrichment’ (Bardhan 1997: 1321). Although different in form, these manifestations 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and quite often coexist. The most common 
forms are: bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, and favouritism/nepotism. 
Perhaps the most useful visualization of the different forms of corruption is provided 
by the United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) 
(Fig. 1). 
 
Corruption can also be categorized in various ways, according to its scale, its location, 
or its prevalence, for example3. A common distinction is made between ‘petty’ and 
‘grand’ corruption (NORAD 2000: 8), or between ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘political’ 
corruption (Morgan 1998: 15). Petty or bureaucratic corruption refers to low-ranking 
public officials using their position to generate money for themselves through 
unofficial charges and bribes. Grand or political corruption refers to higher-level 
bureaucrats and politicians using their positions and influence to earn money. This 
form of corruption often emerges as embezzlement or bribes in the bidding and 
implementation of large-scale government projects, including those funded by aid or 
concessional loans.   
 
Others make a distinction between ‘state capture’ and ‘administrative corruption’ 
(World Bank 2000). Administrative corruption is similar to petty corruption 
mentioned above, as it looks at the conscious distortion in the implementation of laws 
for the ‘private gain of public officials’. However, state capture goes much further 
than this, referring to individuals, groups, or enterprises ‘extracting rent’ from the 
state, and actually changing a country’s ‘basic legal and regulatory framework’ (2000: 
2) 4 . Both administrative corruption and state capture can occur at all levels of 
government. What distinguishes them is not who establishes the relationship, but 
rather the political implications of each type of corruption. 
 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the different forms of corruption, see Amunsden 2000. 
3 For a good classification of the different types of corruption, see Alatas 1990. 
4 A classic example of state capture would be Zaire under Mobutu, see Evans, 1995: 46. 
 4
Fig 1.               Forms of Corruption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNODCCP (2002: 3) 
 
Some also find it useful to distinguish between ‘isolated’ and ‘systemic’ corruption. 
In contexts where corruption is an isolated occurrence, most institutions and 
individuals within them support the formal legal framework. Conversely, in situations 
where it is systemic, bribery and other forms of corruption are prevalent in the 
interface between the public and private sector. There is an ‘equilibrium trap’ where 
incentives are strong for individuals and institutions to accept the status quo (World 
Bank 1997: 10).  
 
Far from being an academic exercise, having a clear definition of what constitutes 
corruption in a given context will affect how it is approached. According to Andvig et 
al, having a narrow definition of corruption is more useful in contexts where 
corruption is limited to a particular segment of the economy or set of institutions. In 
circumstances where corruption is more prevalent, however, it is more useful to use 
broader or more ‘open-ended’ definitions that will enable corrupt networks that cut 
across institutions to be detected (2001: 5). 
Theoretical Approaches 
 
As with definitions, different theoretical approaches influence how agencies evaluate 
corruption and formulate potential methods to combat it. The issue is not whether one 
approach is inherently better, but rather the suitability of the approach to the situation 
at hand. The most prevalent and influential approach to corruption in the aid sector 
has been from the economic perspective. That said, in recent years, political science 
and anthropological perspectives have begun to be used as analytical frameworks to 
place public institutions and their officials within a wider context. 
 
Economic approaches to corruption focus on incentives and disincentives that 
influence public officials’ behavior and their propensity to accept bribes or abuse their 
position. In essence, they look at the economic rationale behind corrupt practices, and 
‘model the corrupt employee as a rational actor who decides whether to engage in 
corrupt activity by balancing the potential benefits against potential costs and 
consequences’ (Morgan 1998: 12). Thus, much anti-corruption work inspired by this 
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framework has focused on public sector management issues that alter the incentives, 
penalties, and possibilities of detection for particular actions. However, this approach, 
while having merit, only looks at instances of corruption in a very defined setting.  
 
It is thus useful to complement this perspective with other approaches. Political 
science perspectives aim to look ‘beyond the visible signs of corruption to the broader 
setting in which it occurs’ (World Bank 1997: 25). However, much of the political 
science work on corruption subsumes it to debates on the nature of different types of 
states and their propensity for democratization5.  
 
That said, variants of ‘New Institutionalism’ are more directly relevant for analyzing 
corruption. Looking at how institutions shape and influence events enables a more 
complete understanding of the context within which public officials work. 
Furthermore, it also broadens the scope of enquiry to include individuals and groups 
outside the public sector, and in turn seeks to understand how they perceive and react 
to different forms of corruption.  
 
Rational choice institutionalism incorporates economic concepts in its analysis of how 
institutions shape an ‘individual’s calculations for engaging in socially optimal or 
suboptimal behavior’ (Dininio 2002: 3). Historical institutionalism uses a similar 
framework, but rather than assuming the individual’s analysis of costs and benefits is 
‘rational and self-interested’, argues that the individual’s perception of what is 
desirable and ‘rational’ is also shaped by the institutional context. Both of these 
perspectives have been influential in encouraging aid agencies to go beyond working 
exclusively with government agencies to enforce existing legislation to looking at 
other issues such as education and prevention in the wider community (Dininio 2002: 
4). 
 
The anthropological approach argues that the common definition of corruption 
assumes that there is always a clear division between the public and private sphere. 
However, this definition, which is based on Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy, is not 
always applicable to non-Western contexts. From an anthropological point of view, 
this definition is too restrictive as it does not fully capture how people in a particular 
context determine what is a corrupt practice and what is not. As Sissener states 
‘people’s own assessments of courses of action do not ar[i]se from a set of culturally 
universal, invariable norms that helps to decide if certain actions are to be classified 
as “corrupt” or not. Rather, what is seen as corruption varies from one context to 
another. Given such variations, explorations of how the actors themselves evaluate 
social practices are required’ (2001: 2).  
 
To this end, anthropology has an array of ‘methodological tools and analytical 
approaches’ geared to discerning individual perspectives of a given phenomenon. 
Through embedding analysis of phenomena like corruption in their wider social 
contexts, anthropological approaches are better able to understand what constitutes 
corruption in a particular context and what social structures act to perpetuate it. 
                                                 
5 See Doig and Theobald (2000), Hope (2000), and Friedrich (1989). 
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Implementation Issues 
Donor Approaches 
This section will look at a cross-section of aid agencies and their approaches to anti-
corruption work. Most agencies have policy frameworks to monitor their own 
operations and project implementation. These policies generally aim to: reduce the 
risk of embezzlement, prevent corruption in procurement, stop diversion of funds 
from specified rubrics, and avoid strengthening corrupt elites through misplaced 
funding (NORAD 2000: 8). 
 
However, this section will look at donor agencies approaches to anti-corruption in 
stakeholder countries. The emphasis is on placed on pinpointing similarities and 
differences in approaches rather than cataloguing initiatives and projects. For a 
comprehensive listing of different anti-corruption activities, readers are invited to 
consult UNODC (2004) and Transparency International (2000). 
 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
 
USAID lays out its approach to the issue in its ‘Handbook on Fighting Corruption’. 
The Handbook aims to provide a ‘framework’ for understanding how corruption 
manifests itself in a particular setting. The framework consists of two pillars. The first 
pillar refers to ‘institutional reforms’ that aim to change the context within which 
public officials carry out their work. The Handbook alleges that ‘corruption arises 
where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse 
incentives’ (1999: 7). As such, USAID recommends a variety of initiatives targeted at 
each of these characteristics. 
 
Regarding authority, USAID recommends reducing the government’s role in the 
economy through policies such as privatization, liberalization, and measures such as 
competitive procurement and fostering competition between public agencies. 
Increased accountability can be achieved through fostering greater transparency and 
oversight of government operations, coupled with strengthened sanctions. Potential 
measures include freedom of information legislation, required employee financial 
disclosures, anti-corruption agencies, and audit offices, among others. Improving or 
realigning incentives refers to measures to promote ethical behavior and increase the 
professionalism of the public service through training, increasing compensation levels 
and introducing performance-based incentives (USAID 1999: 8-13). 
 
The second pillar refers to ‘societal reforms’. USAID recognizes that corruption also 
has ‘socially-embedded incentives’ as well as economic ones. As such, societal 
reforms are aimed at changing attitudes and political will towards corruption, and 
mobilizing public opinion to enable long-term anti-corruption initiatives. A key aspect 
of this involves gathering new information about the nature, expense, and causality 
behind corruption in order to stimulate demand for change. This encompasses 
initiatives such as surveys, public relations campaigns, civil society organizations, 
investigative journalism, and international pressure (USAID 1999: 14-15). 
 
USAID does not propose that anti-corruption strategies include all the measures 
enumerated above. Rather, each strategy should fit the country context, based on a 
thorough analysis of corruption in the country. Such an analysis would consist of: ‘an 
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assessment of the extent, forms, and causes of corruption for the country as a whole 
and for specific government institutions’ (1999: 15). This would be complemented by 
an analysis of the political context, including the extent of political will and potential 
supporters and opponents. 
 
USAID issued a new Anticorruption Strategy in January 2005.  The new Strategy, 
while keeping the same framework, attempts to extend it somewhat. The Strategy 
paper argues that project experience has demonstrated the importance of the political 
context for successful anti-corruption work, stating ‘in an environment of endemic 
corruption, anticorruption efforts must eventually confront grand corruption, or they 
risk rearranging corruption rather than reducing it’ (2005: 13).  
 
As such, the 2005 Strategy keeps the emphasis on institutional reforms and socially-
embedded incentives but complements it with increased attention to the workings of 
the political system. Thus, it utilizes a ‘more comprehensive, systemic approach that 
puts increased emphasis on grand corruption, underlines the larger political and 
economic dynamics that animate corruption, and extends our understanding of the 
nature and impact of political will’ (2005: 14). 
 
United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) 
 
DFID’s Anti-corruption Strategy (1999) argues that there are three ways of tackling 
corruption. The first is reducing opportunities for corruption to occur. This 
encompasses all measures that reduce state discretion, such as increasing the 
transparency and public scrutiny of decision-making processes, or liberalization and 
privatization (accompanied by adequate preparation and strengthening of the legal 
framework). 
 
The second is to change the incentive structure for public officials. This includes 
ensuring public employees have a ‘living wage’, and improving the management of 
public institutions through measures such as merit-based recruitment. 
 
The third is to strengthen the constraints on corrupt behaviour. This encompasses 
improving the transparency of procurement and payroll systems, formalizing audit 
procedures, updating anti-corruption legislation, creating or strengthening anti-
corruption agencies, and increasing parliamentary or civil society oversight of the 
conduct of public officials.  
 
In addition to anti-corruption initiatives, DFID also has activities in three other areas. 
The first relates to the elimination of bribery in international business and trade. 
Following the OECD Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Officials, measures 
include: dis-allowing tax deductions for bribes paid to foreign public officials; 
requiring companies to keep good accounting records, strengthen internal controls, 
and submit to external audits; and barring non-complying firms from bidding for 
public contracts. The second relates to combating money laundering through 
measures such as strengthened legislation, asset-freezing, and requiring financial 
institutions to carry out thorough background checks of their customers. The third 
involves measures to safeguard donor assistance against corruption through concerted 
cross-country adoption of uniform procurement procedures, random audits of tenders, 
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improved transparency of donor initiatives in stakeholder countries, and codes of 
conduct. 
 
DFID (1999: 12-24) 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
 
The UNODC promotes awareness and ratification of the 2003 UN Convention against 
Corruption, which by early 2004 had been signed by some 106 countries (UNODC 
Corruption website, accessed 16/02/2005). In addition, through its Global Program 
against Corruption, the Office provides technical assistance upon request, carries out 
research, disseminates best practices, develops initiatives to strengthen judicial 
integrity, and seeks to improve inter-agency coordination in the anti-corruption field 
(UNODC 2001: 21).  
 
The Office promotes an integrated approach to combating corruption, which rests on 
six pillars. They are: 1) democratic reform 2) strengthening civil society through 
ensuring access to information and promoting oversight of government functions 3) 
fostering the rule of law 4) ensuring an adequate balance of the independence and 
accountability of public offices 5) strategic partnerships at the national and 
international level to advocate and support the implementation of anticorruption 
policies and initiatives 6) strategic national and international partnerships to develop 
new strategies for combating corruption. 
 
UNODC places a great deal of emphasis on the process involved in attacking 
corruption, arguing that ‘such an approach must be evidence-based, non partisan, and 
transparent as well as inclusive, integrated, comprehensive and impact oriented’ 
(2001: 17). 
 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
 
UNDP lays out its approach to combating corruption in its 2004 policy paper, titled 
‘Anticorruption: Practice Note’. The agency treats corruption as a governance issue, 
stating that it is a ‘failure of institutions and a lack of capacity to manage society by 
means of a framework of social, judicial, political and economic checks and balances’ 
(2004: 2). UNDP uses an expanded institutionalist framework to conceptualize 
corruption, where ‘Integrity’ and ‘Transparency’ are grouped with ‘Accountability’ as 
indicative of a country’s wider governance situation. The equation is as follows: 
 
Corruption = (Monopoly and Discretion) – (Accountability + Integrity + 
Transparency)6.  
 
Based on its experience with past projects, UNDP advocates a holistic approach to 
tackling governance and corruption issues. It has a ‘Five-Pronged’ strategy that can be 
adapted to specific country contexts, depending on ‘the established needs, agreed 
upon priorities, available resources and timing of the anti-corruption programme’ 
(2004: 9). The prongs and the measures they refer to are: 
                                                 
6 The original equation, developed by Klitgaard (1988), is Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – 
Accountability. USAID’s approach is closer to this framework, as it concentrates more specifically on 
public officials, through focusing on their monopoly of power, discretion, and accountability. 
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Prevention: simplifying procedures and legislation; increasing the professionalism of 
the public service; strengthening oversight mechanisms; and changing attitudes about 
corruption.  
Enforcement: increasing vigilance through the strengthening of oversight mechanisms 
(police, anti-corruption agencies, complaints mechanisms) and creating disincentives 
for corrupt behavior (penalties, extradition).  
Public Participation and Coalition Building: gauging public perception of corruption 
issues; encouraging freedom of the press; strengthening civil society. 
Strengthening National Integrity Institutions: creating or strengthening oversight 
bodies such as independent commissions on corruption, auditors, public procurement 
supervisory bodies. 
Working with the International Community: sharing good practice and implementing 
international and regional treaties. 
 
UNDP (2004: 8-13) 
 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
 
The OECD focuses on a different aspect of anti-corruption. Rather than focusing on 
the demand side it targets the supply side, seeking to reduce the ability of 
governments and companies to bribe foreign officials. The OECD promoted the 
ratification of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions in 1997. This was the first global convention 
formulated to combat corruption in international business deals. To date, it has been 
ratified by all OECD countries in addition to five non-member countries. A Working 
Group monitors signatory countries’ progress7.  
 
The OECD also works with the private sector, providing guidelines to multinational 
enterprises on measures to deal with corruption and ensure good corporate 
governance (2000: 1). In addition, the OECD carries out work on money laundering, 
and through the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, focuses on 
illegal transactions to launder the proceeds from bribery, corruption, and other 
associated offences.  
 
This work is bolstered by OECD’s participation in various regional anti-corruption 
initiatives. These are geared at helping countries combat corruption through 
promoting best practice on good governance and anti-corruption initiatives as well as 
encouraging mutual or self-evaluation of policies. One such initiative is the 
ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for the Asia-Pacific. To date, 23 countries in 
the region have signed its Action Plan, which is a legal, non-binding agreement that 
aims to bolster anti-corruption measures in the public sector, private sector and civil 
society. 
 
ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for the Asia-Pacific website (accessed 
21/02/05) 
 
                                                 
7 However, there have been problems with the Convention’s implementation, particularly regarding 
export credit agencies based in OECD countries. For more details see The Cornerhouse (2003: 16-22).  
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Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
 
The Asian Development Bank puts forth its approach to anti-corruption in its policy 
document ‘Anti-corruption: Our Framework, Strategies, and Policies’. The ADB 
emphasizes efforts to increase the efficiency of markets and the caliber of public 
sector institutions. The emphasis is on prevention of corruption, rather than the 
criminalization of offenders. Progress is more viable through long-term ‘economic, 
legal, and institutional reforms’ (1998: 20). However, the ADB’s approach focuses 
exclusively on the economic aspect of corruption, seeking to avoid ‘interference’ in 
client countries. To this end, the ADB’s anti-corruption strategy has the three 
following objectives: 
 
Supporting competitive markets and efficient and transparent public administration: 
this involves reducing or eliminating market distortions and opportunities for 
corruption by firms or public officials. This is accomplished through measures such as 
privatization, liberalization, and the evaluation of existing regulatory frameworks. 
These policies are also complemented by civil service reform measures such as 
improving employment conditions, increasing oversight mechanisms, and increasing 
transparency. 
 
Supporting anticorruption initiatives on a case-by-case basis and improving the 
quality of dialogue on governance issues: the ADB will evaluate requests from 
member countries to support specific anti-corruption initiatives. Assistance will be 
evaluated contingent on: the request coming from the member country’s government; 
the initiative’s consistency with wider ADB operational strategies and current 
projects; and the initiative’s link to the ABD’s areas of expertise. 
 
Ensuring ADB projects and staff adhere to professional ethic standards: this entails 
more ‘robust’ internal measures to ensure and increase the professional integrity of 
ADB initiatives. This includes: ensuring the integrity of the ABD’s lending and 
technical assistance; increasing the monitoring and management of loans and grants; 
upgrading procurement policies; re-writing the Code of Conduct and establishing 
internal reporting procedures; and ensuring staff awareness of anticorruption 
measures and protocols. 
 
ADB (1998: 20-27) 
 
World Bank 
 
The World Bank’s priority is to foster economic development and alleviate poverty in 
client countries.  For the Bank, dealing with corruption and wider governance issues 
is seen to be central to this effort, due to the corrosive effects that corruption and 
‘dysfunctional public sector institutions’ have. Thus, the institution’s anti-corruption 
strategy is multi-pronged and focuses on ‘underlying economic and institutional 
reform’ (2000: 21). The emphasis is to move beyond a focus on public institutions 
and their administration and look at ‘broader structural relationships’ that include: the 
political context, state-civil society relationships, and state-private sector relationships 
(Fig 2).  
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Fig. 2  The World Bank Anti-Corruption Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Anti-Corruption website (accessed 19/01/05) 
 
The different prongs are: 
 
Political Accountability: Changing the incentives for public officials to behave 
ethically can be achieved through decreasing their discretion and increasing the 
accountability and transparency of their tasks. This is done through measures such as: 
fostering greater political competition between political parties; supervising the 
finances of political parties; strengthening rules and legal instruments to ensure 
ethical behavior; and increasing public scrutiny of government. 
 
Civil Society Participation: Civil society organizations (CSOs) carry out the 
important function of ‘mediating’ between the state and the public, and can be pivotal 
in combating corruption. However, while it is vital to foster the participation of CSOs, 
it is also important to ensure that they are subjected to public scrutiny to ensure 
adequate levels of accountability and transparency. 
 
Competitive Private Sector: Powerful elites can ‘capture’ the state and subvert 
responsible policy making. Key policies such as liberalization, fostering competition, 
carrying out regulatory reform, and promoting good corporate governance can act as 
powerful constraints on the ability of such groups to capture the state. 
 
Anti- 
Corruption
Political Accountability 
•Political competition 
•Transparency in party financing
•Asset declaration 
Public Sector Management 
•Professional civil service 
•Decentralization 
•Tax + Customs 
•Sectoral service delivery 
 
Civil Society Participation 
•Freedom of Information 
•Public hearing of draft laws 
•Role for media/NGOs 
Institutional Restraints on Power
•Independent/effective judiciary 
•Legislative oversight 
•Independent prosecution 
Competitive Private Sector
•Deregulation 
•Tax Simplification 
•Macroeconomic Stability 
•Demonopolisation 
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Institutional Restraints on Power: The structure and ‘institutional design’ of the state 
can influence whether and how corruption emerges. Measures to promote the 
separation of powers and ensure oversight can help decrease opportunities for the 
abuse of power. These include: fostering an independent and effective judiciary, 
passing anti-corruption legislation, and ensuring effective auditing, among other 
things. 
 
Transparency International 
 
Transparency International is one of the most active civil society organizations at the 
forefront of efforts to combat corruption. Its approach to corruption, termed the 
National Integrity System (NIS), has played a very important role in shaping 
perceptions of the nature of corruption and methods to combat it. 
 
According to Doig and McIvor, the NIS is used as a ‘comprehensive and holistic 
approach to combating corruption’. While recognizing that countries have different 
historical, political, social, and economic contexts, they contend that there are 
similarities in how corruption can be approached and lessons learned in one context 
can be transferred. Transparency International proposes the National Integrity system 
as a comprehensive method of combating corruption. It is a framework that can be 
used to identify loci of corruption, pinpoint key institutions, and formulate responses 
(2003: 327).  
 
Fig. 3    The Pillars of Integrity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Langseth, Stapenhurst, and Pope (1997: 11) 
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Corruption is perceived of as a systemic phenomenon that can be addressed by 
reducing opportunities for corruption and increasing disincentives for corrupt 
behavior. The NIS is aimed at preventing corruption through changing social systems 
and institutions rather than punishing individuals (1997: 9). The National Integrity 
System is comprised of eight ‘pillars’ (Fig 3). They are: public awareness, public anti-
corruption strategies, public participation, ‘watchdog’ agencies, the judiciary, the 
media, the private sector, and international cooperation (2003: 317)’. The pillars are 
interdependent, in that weaker pillars will increase pressure on others to uphold the 
integrity system. The challenge is to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
each of the pillars and involve the government, civil society, and wider aid 
community in an overall program of institutional strengthening (1997: 10). 
Lessons Learned 
 
This next section will provide an overview of the lessons learned from the 
documentation reviewed. The findings have been confined, where possible, to 
discussions relating to real projects or specific contexts rather than simple normative 
statements. This task was made all the more difficult by the complexity inherent in 
gauging the effectiveness of anti-corruption projects. For convenience, the lessons 
learned have been grouped into two sections. The first deals with how corruption is 
conceptualized and the second with considerations regarding implementation. 
 
Conceptualization issues 
 
The nature of the lessons learned indicates that donor agencies operate under a 
significant number of preconceived notions about corruption, its manifestations, and 
methods of combating it.  
 
One of the most frequently cited lessons is that rather than specific initiatives 
pinpointed at a select number of institutions, anti-corruption initiatives must be long-
term and comprehensive in order to be effective (UNDP 2004: 6, DAC 2003: 7, 
World Bank 2000: 1, USAID 2005: 12). This is perhaps most eloquently summed up 
by Tanzi, who states ‘the greatest mistake that can be made is to rely on a strategy that 
depends excessively on actions in a single area, such as increasing the salaries of the 
public sector employees; or increasing penalties…and expect results quickly’ (1998: 
30). 
 
Similarly, practitioners stress the importance of avoiding standard solutions to 
corruption issues. UNDP argues that there are no established ‘models’ to combat 
corruption. While knowledge of ‘best practice’ can be useful and provide guidance, 
this is not necessarily applicable in all circumstances (2004: 6). While some agencies 
such as Transparency International promote the use of over-arching frameworks to 
capture different manifestations of corruption, they also stress the individuality and 
specificity of each country (Doig and McIvor 2003: 317). 
 
Practitioners also argue that more effort needs to be placed on gaining knowledge of 
the target country in order to contextualise analyses of corruption. UNDP (2004: 8) 
argues for the importance of adequately assessing the social, political, cultural, and 
economic context of a country in order to fully understand how corruption manifests 
itself in a particular situation.  
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Haarhuis and Leeuw, in their evaluation of World Bank anti-corruption work, argue 
that while the theoretical arguments for many anti-corruption measures are sound 
(decentralization, wage increases for public officials, stiffer penalties etc.), the 
empirical grounding is ‘case-specific’ and actually very inconclusive (2004: 553, 
Appendix 1). In addition, many initiatives such as fostering civil society participation 
and privatizing state bodies can and do have unforeseen consequences. Therefore, the 
actual specificities of the stakeholder country need to be thoroughly evaluated before 
a particular course of action is recommended. 
 
Furthermore, anti-corruption initiatives need to widen their scope to include other 
actors. UNODCCP argues that ‘traditionally, the focus of donor attention has been on 
the Executive branch of government, particularly the programs and activities 
belonging to government ministries’. This perspective has excluded other branches of 
government, the private sector, civil society, or the wider public as partners and 
possible change agents (UNODCCP 1999a: 9). UNDOCCP states that most anti-
corruption initiatives involve those who are paid to fight corruption, rather than those 
who experience it directly. The World Bank concurs, stating that this perspective 
limits strategies to ‘standardized technical solutions’ that are then ‘incomplete and 
overly uniform’ (2000: 1).  
 
In addition to working with other sectors, there is a need to extend the analysis of 
corruption beyond a limited set of institutions. Andvig et al. make the point that in 
many developing countries, authority and power are ‘wielded through informal 
political and market networks’ (2001: 23). More effort needs to be dedicated to 
understanding the mechanisms through which power is accumulated and used, 
because state capture may be only one component of a strategy to amass wealth. Anti-
corruption initiatives that focus only on visible state structures will simply displace 
corrupt networks to other institutions. Similarly, the World Bank argues that while a 
good deal is known about the causes and consequences of corruption, comparatively 
little is known about why it persists (2000: 1).  
 
Possessing deeper understanding of how and where corruption manifests itself permits 
a greater degree of flexibility in designing projects. There are a variety of ‘entry 
points’ or related topics that enable the corruption agenda to be addressed. For 
example, in a highly conflictual context, corruption issues can be tackled under the 
wider umbrella of governance. Or conversely, where a particular type of corruption 
may be of public concern, initiatives can first address this issue as a way of 
capitalizing on public awareness - before then moving on to other issues (DAC 2003: 
33).  
 
The extent of corruption also determines the adequacy of a particular initiative. 
UNDP states that countries where corruption is isolated allow considerable scope for 
‘creative programming’ (2004: ii). Conversely, in areas where corruption is deeply 
rooted, more concerted action may be needed to ‘confront states where governments 
have shown little political will to implement anticorruption reform and where 
anticorruption assistance has stalled due to a pervasively corrupt surrounding 
environment’ (Tisne and Smilov 2004: 63). 
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However, even though adequate emphasis may be placed on placing corruption within 
its wider context, many initiatives place undue emphasis on the ‘criminalisation’ of 
corrupt practices and the prosecution of perpetrators. UNODCCP argues that not 
enough work is done with the victims of corruption (2002: 11). NORAD contends that 
the focus on the illegality of particular practices comes at the expense of other types 
of initiatives such as those aimed at prevention and education (2000: 20). This 
emphasis is unsuited to many developing countries facing serious resource constraints, 
as legal processes can be lengthy and expensive.  
 
Implementation Issues 
 
Fostering Civil Society Organizations  
 
Many anti-corruption initiatives have a component oriented at fostering widespread 
political participation and strengthening civil society groups.  At one level, this tactic 
can be very fruitful. CSOs, where they exist, can contribute to awareness-raising 
campaigns, carry out diagnostic surveys, uncover abuses, and provide political 
leadership, among other things. In addition, CSOs do not always have confrontational 
relationships with government institutions, and can sometimes form unexpected 
alliances with the private sector or state bodies (DAC 2003: 35). 
 
However, civil society organizations are also part of wider social networks that can 
limit their effectiveness. Jenkins and Goetz (1999) analyze anti-corruption movements 
in India. They question the ability of civil society groups – particularly those 
‘fostered’ by the state – to press for greater governmental accountability. The authors 
argue that many such organizations are not fully independent from the state and are 
thus ‘compromised’ – unable to militate effectively for greater transparency. 
Furthermore, many such movements once created or nurtured, often develop in 
unexpected ways. The DAC supports this, saying civil society organizations and 
NGOS ‘are not without their own governance and management problems’ (2003: 36).  
 
Forming Broad Anti-Corruption Coalitions 
 
Other strategies aim to go beyond civil society organizations and create broad-based 
coalitions for reform. However, this approach is based on a variety of assumptions, 
including: social pressure influences state institutions; donors and stakeholders have a 
shared understanding of corruption and the desirable measures to combat it; and 
awareness of corruption and its prevalence will motivate citizens to fight it (Tisne and 
Smilov 2004: 18).  
 
However, these assumptions must be questioned. Haarhuis and Leeuw argue that 
raising awareness about levels of corruption in a particular situation will not 
necessarily result in concrete changes. As they state, ‘there is no automatic 
progression from awareness of an unjust situation towards bringing it to an end’ 
(2004: 550). Morgan makes the observation that programmatic interventions to 
combat corruption are fundamentally different from initiatives to foster political 
commitment to combat it (1998: 5). The DAC supports this, stating ‘Participatory 
approaches do not directly fight corruption. However, they are one of a number of 
tools needed to create an enabling environment’ (2003: 37). 
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Tisne and Smilov, in their analysis of anti-corruption movements in Eastern Europe, 
find that initiatives cannot assume that diverse sections of society will be mobilized 
by wide-ranging anti-corruption campaigns. They state ‘the broad all-purpose serving 
shape of coalitions suited the conceptualization of corruption as promoted by the 
donor community: a broad overarching developmental problem with causes and 
consequences spanning a range of different reform areas, but was ill-suited to creating 
lasting public movements for change’ (2004: 35). The authors found that public 
support of broad initiatives waned after an initial period. Tisne and Smilov also found 
that while anti-corruption coalitions strove to include a broad cross-section of civil 
society, this did not automatically mean that they would be seen as independent from 
the government (2004: 29).  
 
Furthermore, Tisne and Smilov indicate the need for a deeper understanding of how to 
successfully manage the political aspect of creating and sustaining coalitions. Rather 
than assuming that ‘Corruption’ is sufficient to bring all sections of society on board, 
they indicate the necessity of developing more sophisticated campaigns focusing on 
specific objectives for particular constituencies (2004: 28). In addition, the authors 
indicate the need for a more careful management of public sentiment both in terms of 
avoiding fatigue and ensuring the results of particular initiatives are realistic. The 
authors found that earlier campaigns had been too ambitious and wide-ranging. The 
ensuing failure of these projects to have a visible and real impact on corruption in 
these countries resulted in high levels of cynicism and fatigue (2004: 65-67). 
UNODCCP supports this, stating that awareness raising and enforcement initiatives 
must be well-balanced to avoid cynicism and the perception that corruption is 
widespread and unchecked (2002: 5).  
 
Institutional Reform 
 
Tisne and Smilov also review the assumptions underlying initiatives aimed at 
promoting institutional reform. They argue that projects of this nature attempt to 
change the incentive structure facing public servants with the longer-term aim of 
reducing corruption. However, by solely focusing on the determinants of individual 
behavior within the institution, this assumes that corruption is not a product of the 
wider context within which these institutions are placed. 
 
The authors found that the most successful institutional reform projects were those 
targeted at the lowest echelons of government, namely those that have frequent 
contact with the public. The creation of new offices dedicated to dealing with the 
public, such as ‘one-stop shops’ were very well received (2004: 57). Through 
improving the transparency of government interactions, they reduced petty corruption 
and improved trust between citizens and public officials. 
 
However, the focus on projects on particular institutions proved problematic. As they 
state ‘even projects that were well-conceived, well-run and aided by good 
coordination between donors could still be overwhelmed by the underlying political 
structures that shape the countries’ administration’ (2004: 59). This is supported by 
UNDP, who stresses the long-term political dimension to successful anti-corruption 
campaigns (2004: 8-9). 
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Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
One of the most frequently cited lessons learned was regarding the monitoring and 
evaluation of anti-corruption projects. Surveys of anti-corruption projects found that 
evaluation was geared to quantifiable indicators relating to project implementation 
(legislation enacted, number of publicity campaigns, etc.) rather than indicators 
related to the impact on corruption such as a decline in complaints to the police or 
Ombudsman (Tisne and Smilov 2004: 27). 
 
Conversely, greater citizen involvement in the measurement of corruption has been 
found to be particularly effective. Used properly, the information gathered from 
surveys can be used to mobilize local communities to push for greater accountability 
from public institutions (UNODCCP 1999a: 19, World Bank 2000b: 2).  Methods 
such as Service Delivery Surveys (SDSs), pioneered by CIET International, have 
proven particularly effective. Originally developed to track diseases, this 
methodology has now been effectively utilized to gauge the prevalence and severity 
of corruption in many countries. Household members and service providers are 
surveyed by trained local people throughout a country or region in order to gather 
information about the quality of service from different government institutions. This 
quantitative information is complemented by qualitative information gained from 
focus group and key informant interviews. This quantity of information permits a 
more nuanced analysis of what government ministries and which parts of the country 
suffer the most from corruption (UNODCCP 1999a: 19-22).  
Conclusion 
 
Anti-corruption is becoming an integral part of donor policy frameworks. This is 
because evidence on the long-term negative impact of corruption is increasing, and 
the importance of client countries’ overall policies for sustainable aid outcomes is also 
being recognized. However, while donor practices are evolving, this survey of past 
experiences reveals a need for more work in a number of areas. 
 
First, the sophistication of the ‘lessons learned’ in most donor evaluations is rather 
limited. The majority of successful initiatives depend on a great deal of context-
specific factors. However, they are taken out of context when evaluated, which leads 
to general conclusions like ‘civil society is important’ that have lost their relevance 
and applicability. Secondly, the lack of contextual awareness leads evaluators to seek 
to universalize the applicability of these lessons. While certain policies may be 
transferable, others, particularly those with political implications, are clearly not. 
 
Second, awareness of the political aspect of anti-corruption initiatives needs to be 
strengthened. This is particularly evident in two areas. The first relates to political 
mobilization strategies used to garner support for anti-corruption movements. 
Evidence shows that these strategies need to be more nuanced and targeted to specific 
types of corruption, rather than a vague over-arching concept of ‘corruption’. 
Furthermore, these initiatives need to have longer time horizons, balancing periods of 
heightened awareness with periods of rest, to avoid cynicism and fatigue. Second, 
more work needs to be done to determine how and in what circumstances high-level 
political will can be harnessed usefully to support anti-corruption initiatives. This 
entails looking at the structure and nature of political parties, the type of political 
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dialogue, and how current political priorities lend themselves to introducing 
corruption-related issues. 
 
Third, more work needs to be done on methods of evaluating progress in combating 
corruption. To date, evaluations are too centered on the initiative being implemented, 
rather than the particular instance of corruption that is being targeted. This can cause 
the effectiveness of particular initiatives to be overestimated, as attention is directed 
to accessible indicators such as the creation of new legislation or new institutions. 
Thus, monitoring must seek to embed projects within the wider social context and use 
different indicators. Some options are, as the next point will elaborate, community-
based.  
 
Fourth, while anti-corruption discourse often makes mention of community 
participation, the emphasis is placed on including stakeholders in the implementation 
of initiatives. New research shows that communities can play a vital role in measuring 
corruption. Community-based diagnostic surveys can play a key role in generating 
valuable and detailed information that can improve project formulation. This 
information can permit the prevalence of corruption to be mapped and regions or 
ministries characterized by higher levels of corruption to be signaled. These surveys 
are also useful for tracking the prevalence of corruption over time, which can then be 
used effectively to judge the progress and effectiveness of particular institutions. 
 
Fifth, the analysis of corruption needs to be expanded into new sectors.  To date, 
research and projects have concentrated on sectors where corruption is particularly 
visible. This includes infrastructure, customs, and taxation. However, corruption, 
while less overt, is also prevalent in sectors such as health and education. The 
profusion of unofficial fees and charges has very serious implications for equity. A 
more community-based approach may well reveal that tackling corruption in these 
sectors may provide interesting ‘entry-points’ for a more encompassing public debate 
on corruption. 
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Web-based Resources 
 
Useful websites that readers may wish to consult include the following: 
 
World Bank, Public Sector Governance > Anti-corruption - 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm 
 
World Bank Institute 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/index.html 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Programme Against Corruption 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption.html 
 
ANCORR Web – http://www1.oecd.org/daf/nocorruptionweb/ 
 
Utstein Anti-corruption Resource Centre – http://www.u4.no/index2.cfm 
 
Coris - http://www.corisweb.org/ 
 
Transparency International – www.transparency.org 
 
Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) - http://www.cmi.no/area4.cfm 
